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Historically,  generalization  about  economic  fluctuations  in  an  economic  system  over  extended 
periods of time has proved to be difficult.  Yet, it has been even more difficult to generalize across 
economic systems.  In a historical setting, there are many theories offered to explain the creation of 
business cycles.  In this study it is argued that the business cycle is not caused by a single factor but 
by  a  multiplicity  of  factors,  therefore,  such  competing  theories  constitute  special  cases  of  the 
business cycle.  This study maintains that there are families of business cycles, with each family 
representing a related set of economic systems.  Given a family approach to economic systems, then 
it is conceivable that a general theory can be developed for each family of economic systems by 
grouping factors identifiable with particular sets of economic systems. Data from the United Nations 
for 137 countries were used to establish a classification scheme for families of economic systems.  
US time series data were examined to assess the plausibility of the general theory for one family of 






            Historically,  business  cycles  are  defined  as  fluctuations  in  income,  output  and 
employment.    In  most  studies  on  business  cycles  (sometimes  referred  to  as  economic 
cycles), authors are divided on the causes of those cycles.  Some authors focus on a singular 
cause or on the inability to generalize on the cause of the business cycles.  The singular 
cause identified differs among the "singular cause" theorists from a monetary shock to the 
multiplier  principle  or  the  accelerator  principle.   Given  this  lack  of consensus, Gordon 
[1986, 3] maintains that economists are confronted with "the difficulty of developing a 
single theory that encompasses major features of business cycles." 
            Hicks [1950, 2] maintained that: (1) cycles are not uniform; (2) while they do share 
a  family  likeness,  they  differ  considerably  among  themselves;  and  (3)  their  common 
characteristics  are  difficult  to  identify.    Hicks'  [1950,1-2]  comment  on  the  inability  to 
generalize  was  due to the fact that statistical theorists had warned that "purely random 
sequences of events ... have a definite tendency to build up into cyclical patterns."  This 
position of the statistical theorists is quite interesting, given the "mathematical theory of 
chaos" today [Goodwin 1989, 115-138].  
 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND CYCLE FACTORS 
 
            Economic systems are dynamic systems which differ in operating philosophies and 
institutional frameworks.  The differing operating philosophies and institutional settings do 
produce different institutional effects on economic systems [Mullins and Wadhwani 1989].   
Furthermore, each economic system is not the same over an extended period of time, since 
there are many structural and operating changes taking place over time.  This position is not 
of recent origin; a similar view has been advanced by Hamberg [1951, 361].  It comes as no 
surprise that there have been changes in the U.S. economy [Gordon 1969].  Clear evidence 
on changes between 1914 and 1982 in the financial structure of the U.S. economy has been 
presented by Friedman [1986].  These changes make the system less vulnerable to some 
instability factors, while making it susceptible to new instability factors. Owing to these 
conditions, a generalization of economic fluctuations is rendered difficult.  The position of 
Zarnowitz and Moore [1986, 572] reflects the current thinking on business cycles: 
 
"..  [V]arious  structural,  institutional,  and  policy  changes  contributed  to  the 
evolution  of  the  business  cycles.    The  process  is  continuing.  There  have  been 
important  changes,  yet  the  most  basic  characteristics  ...  of    the  business  cycles 
remain the same ..." 
 
            The difficulty with generalizing about business fluctuations in an economic system 
for an extended period is different from the difficulty with generalizing across economic 
systems which are encompassed within three hierarchical layers: (1) closed, partially open, 
and open economies; (2) fully developed, developing, and less developed economies; and 
(3) capitalist, socialist, mixed, and Japanese styled economies.  The term "Japanese styled" 
economies is used because that type of economy is driven by a visible hand (The Ministry 
of  International  Trade  and  Industry),  as  opposed  to  the  invisible  hand  of  the  capitalist 
economies.  South Korea and Taiwan are to be considered as "Japanese styled" economies 
[Johnson 1982, Chap. one; 27,628,631-635].  Also to be considered in the family of this 
type of economic system are Malaysia and Singapore. 
            The various economic styles reflect different operating philosophies.  For instance, 
the inventory adjustment effect on capitalist economies will be much more severe than on a 
Japanese  styled  economy,  because  in  the  latter  manufacturing  inventory  is  held  to  the  
 
economic minimum.  Another example is that of chronic over-production at one time and 
under-production  at  another  time.  This  condition,  which  is  witnessed  in  capitalist 
economies due to a lack of production coordination among business firms, will not appear 
in  socialist  economies  with  coordinated  production  [Lange  1938,  105-106].    However, 
socialist economies invariably experience underproduction [Nuti 1989, 430].  In addition, 
Fairise and Langot [1994, 1592] have concluded that given the finding by Danthine and 
Donaldson  (1991)  that  the  US  labor  market  does  not  share  the  same  features  with  the 
European markets then the US model of the business cycle is insufficient to explain the 
European business cycle.  Accordingly, differing circumstances with each set representing 
forces of resistance and sources of vulnerability are accountable for the many special cases 
of the business cycle.  Therefore, the business cycle cannot be attributed to a single factor 
but to a multiplicity of factors. 
            In spite of the foregoing diversity, it is conceivable that a general theory can be 
developed by grouping diverse factors associated with the business cycle and identifying 
each group of factors with particular economic systems.  Based upon the information in 
Tables 1 and 2, there are thirty-six possible economic systems.  If cycle factors related to 
each specific family can be identified, then generalization is possible.   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
TABLE  1 
  




            Industrialized                             Structural Type                    Countries Classified 
  
            Highly                                     O-1      P-1        C-1                                16 
            Moderately                              O-2      P-2      C-2                                103 
            Less                                         O-3      P-3        C-3                                18                   
  
            # of Countries                                                                                       137                    




The classification for Table 1 is as follows:  
 
Open Economy                 -    Imports or exports are, on the average, greater than 70% of 
GDP for the Years 1972-1986.  
  
 
Partially Open Economy  - Imports and Exports are, on the average, between 15% and 
70% of GDP for the Years 1972-1986. 
 
Closed Economy               - Imports and exports are, on the average, less than 15% of 
GDP for the Years 1972-1986. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TABLE  2 
 
MATRIX OF PHILOSPOHICAL TYPES OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                    ---------------------Philosophical   Types-----------------           
Factors                       Capitalist       Socialist          Mixed             Japanese  
 
Initiating:  
     Population                   Yes                Yes                  Yes                    Yes 
     Technology                   Yes                Yes                  Yes                    Yes 
     Government            
            Policies                Yes                Yes                  Yes                    Yes  
     Business      
            Practices               Severe            Mild               Strong                 Mild   
Activated:  
     Multiplier                    Yes                Yes                  Yes                    Yes  
     Accelerator                  Yes                Yes                  Yes                    Yes   
Accentuating:  
     Slow response of  
            Interest Rate         Yes                 No                  Yes                    No 
Terminating: 
     Diminishing Returns 
            on Investment      Severe            Mild               Strong                 Mild  
     Government  
            Policies                Yes                 Yes                 Yes                    Yes  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
     




The classification for Table 2 is as follows: (Foreign investments and overseas export are an 
inherent part of the classification scheme.) 
 
Socialism     State (Government controls all key sectors of the economy including: foreign trade, 
major industries, production distribution networks, public utilities, banking and credit 
systems.    Direct  foreign  investment  is  not  welcomed.    Light  industry  and  the 
agricultural sector are often privately owned.  Hospitals and health care are usually 
free of charge and operated by state agencies.   
 
Capitalism   Private ownership dominates all key sector of the economy including: all industries, 
foreign  trade,  utilities,  insurance,  banking  and  agriculture.    There  is  limited 
government ownership and intervention.  Foreign investment  is not discouraged.  In 
most cases, fees are charged for health care.  Government subsidies are given for those 
who qualify.  Primary, secondary, and higher levels of education are offered at both 
private and public schools.   
 
Mixed            State  has  nationalized  or  considerable  control  on  key  industries  such  as:  public 
utilities,  petroleum,  banking,  transportation  and  major  manufacturing.    Foreign 
investment is accepted.  There exist many privately owned smaller businesses and 
light  industry.    Agriculture  and  fishing  are  often  operated  by  private  ownership.  
Health care is free under government sponsorship or subsidies.  In some instances, 
fees are charged. 
 
Japanese 
  Styled         This system is characterized by a participatory approach to operating the economic 
system.  All segments of the society are monitored by and supported by government 
action.  The emphasis is on cooperation and not on competitive markets. 
  
            The magnitude and duration of a business cycle is dependent upon the structure of 
the economic system and its operating philosophy.  The ability of the system to respond to 
dynamic changes will determine the severity of the business cycle.  For instance, systems 
which  are  characterized  by  labor-management-government  confrontation  will  be  less 
responsive than systems which accentuate cooperation. 
 
Classification of Factors 
 
A broad classification of the more important factors identified as individual causes 
of business cycle creation is presented below in chronological order.    
  1.  Money Shocks (changes in the volume of money) [Hayek 1932].             
  2.  Deficient Demand [Keynes 1936]. 
  3.  Monetary Dislocation [Bresciani-Turonni 1937, chap.V].  
  4.  Uncoordinated Plans [Lange 1938; Hall, 1986]. 
  5.  Credit Expansion [Hayek 1939; Hawtrey 1950]. 
  6.  Accounting Information [Lacey 1944; Bach 1958; Baxter 1969]. 
  7.  Corporate Earnings Retention/Investment [Kalecki 1954]. 
  8.  Volatility of Expectations [Kaldor 1960; Lowe 1965; Shackle 1968]. 
  9.  Irregularity of Investment [Lowe 1965]. 
10.  Unsystematic Money Shocks [Lucas 1981]. 
11.  Random Technological Shocks [Long and Plosser 1983]. 
12.  Deterministic Chaos [Brock and Sayers 1988]. 
 
            Of the twelve cycle factors, the money shocks (sytematic and unsystematic) would 
be the least influential in the creation of business cycles.  Historically, money shocks do not  
 
have the ascribed impact on the economy.  Empirical evidence suggests that when money is 
treated as an exogenous variable by policy, financial innovations are introduced by business 
firms to restore the endogenous nature of money in the economy [Judd and Scadding 1982, 
1001-1005,1013].   Money as a cause of the business cycle is disputed theoretically by, inter 
alios, Williamson [1987] and on empirical grounds by Friedman [1986, 437,451-455].  The 
view  of  accounting  information  as  the  cause  of  business  cycles  places  the  burden  of 
business  cycle  creation  on  financial  accounting  measurement  [Lacey  1944;  Bach  1958; 
Baxter 1969].  The origin of this view seemingly stems from the 1927 articles (Business 
Cycles--An  Accounting  Error!)  written  by  an  accounting  theorist,  Fritz  Schmidt  ("Die 
Industriekonjunktur--Ein Rechenfehler!" Zeitschrift fuer Betriebswirtschaft, Vol.4, 1927).  
Domar [1957] has strenuously challenged this view.  Yet, this view still persists.  It is 
maintained that healthy financial position provides for an acceleration of investment, and 
poor financial position provides for accentuated contractions [Bernanke and Gertler 1989]. 
            In  a  summary  review  of  the  theories  and  empirical  works  on  business  cycles, 
Zarnovitz [1985, 570] maintains that the Rational Expectations model is the new fad and 
not a legitimate contender. It was excluded from the list above because it is only a key 
assumption of a legitimate contender - real business cycles (RBC) [Stadler 1994, 1750-
1751].  In the RBC model, cycles in exogenous technology disturbances drive cycles in 
output.  However, cyclical activity in output and employment is not a consequence of a 
purely  temporary  shock  to  productivity;  only  temporary  deviations  in  output  and 
employment  away  from  their  long-run  paths  are  the  end  results  of  a  temporary  shock 
[Stadler 1994, 1769].  Random technological shocks [Long and Plosser 1983] is the main 
framework of the RBC model [Stadler 1994, 1752]; it is based on the premise that there are 
disturbances to a continuous equilibrium setting but full employment equilibrium is restored 
after the random shocks are experienced. This condition has yet to be observed.  To the 
contrary, in the European Community, the record unemployment levels peaked in 1985 but 
has not returned to the levels of the 1980s; and it is still far away from the much lower 
levels of unemployment of the 1970s [Woodford 1994, 1813]. 
            While  the  RBC  model  has  contributed  much  to  the  current  understanding  of 
macroeconomic  phenomena,  historical  evidence  does  not  support  the  existence  of  
 
continuous  equilibrium.  Estey  [1956,  102]  concluded  that  the  conditions  of  stable 
equilibrium are violated by business cycle behavior.  The available evidence on business 
cycles reveals a fundamental instability in the economic system.  Once the economic system 
is moved from equilibrium, the forces which are set in motion are not the forces which are 
inclined to restore equilibrium; instead, the forces which are responsible for disturbing the 
system's equilibrium cause the system to move farther away from the original equilibrium.  
The  progressive  departure  of  the  economic  system  from  equilibrium  is  halted  by  the 
resultant strain on the system; this strain sets up limits that not even the tremendous power 
of the cumulative forces of expansion or contraction can overcome.  Hence, the attribution 
of the business cycles to random technological shocks is untenable. 
            Deterministic chaos is the latest entry in the literature.  The mathematics for this 
model is similar to the mathematics used for the RBC model.  The difference lies in the use 
of a stochastic growth model in RBC theory which generates a stochastic process with an 
infinite dimension, whereas chaos theory (as used in studying business cycles) deals with 
deterministic processes which appear random but have a finite dimension [7, p.73].  While 
the  deterministic  chaos  approach  has  produced  new  statistical  and  diagnostic  methods 
capable of uncovering empirical regularities which are indiscernible by other methods, little 
evidence of low-dimensional chaos has been found [Brock and Sayers 1988, 88].  
 
Propagation Mechanisms and Impulses 
 
            Pre-Keynesian theories of the business cycles emphasized propagation mechanisms 
and focused on the internal dynamics of the economic system [Gordon 1986, 5].  Ragnar 
Frisch  [1933]  provided  a  new  perspective  and  made  a  clear  distinction  between  those 
factors which are impulses and others (propagation mechanisms) which propagate business 
cycles.  Knut Wicksell (1907) has been credited by Frisch [1933, 198] as being the first 
scholar to: (1) recognize the two distinct cycle problems: impulse and propagation; and (2) 
attribute business cycles to erratic shocks to the economic system.  Eugen Slutsky (1927) 
and G. Udny Yule (1927) have been credited by Frisch [1933, 198] as the first scholars to 
have  provided  mathematical  studies  of  the  mechanism  by  which  an  impulse  can  be 
propagated to produce a business cycle.  Apparently, this distinction is quite important to  
 
the development of a general theory.  While the works of Wicksell (1907), Slutsky (1927) 
and Yule (1927) predates that of Hayek [1932], those works were abstract and did not offer 
a  specific  cause  or  specific  causes.    The  importance  of  those  abstract  works  were  not 
ignored.    Hayek  [1932,  140-141]    recognized  that  it  is  necessary  to  focus  on  the 
propagators, since in their absence there would be no business cycles.  Kalecki [1954, 102-
105]  viewed  investment  as  being  conditioned  by  corporate  earnings  retention;  this 
relationship  precludes  the  automatic  response  of  investment  to  erratic  shocks  to  the 
economic system. 
            In current times, attention has been given to the role of impulses.  Eckstein and 
Sinai [1986, 40-41] have identified five major impulses: 
 
    1. A rise in aggregate demand. 
    2. A decline in aggregate demand. 
    3. Sudden curtailments of key supplies which affect production. 
    4. Increases in price due to the removal of price controls. 
    5. Sharp increases in the interest rates. 
 
            Of  the  five  impulses  enumerated,  the  interest  rate  is  considered  as  the  most 
dominant impulse.  Farmer [1984, 921] maintains that the interest rate has a significant 
influence on business fluctuations.  High interest rates cause firms to go into bankruptcy; 
hence, output is reduced.  Akhtar [1983, 319,327] concluded that an increase in interest 
rates influences inventory adjustments and the impact of inventory adjustment on GNP is 
quite significant.  Ramey [1989, 351] maintains that inventory investment appears to have 
two  roles  in  the  business  cycle:  (1)  an  important  propagation  mechanism  and  (2)  an 
important  source  of  shocks.    However,  it  would  be  deficient  demand  or  a  significant 
increase in the interest rate that would produce a shock effect on inventory.  Blanchard and 
Watson  [1986,  146]  investigated  the  properties  and  the  roles  of  shocks  in  economic 
fluctuations during the period 1950-1982 and concluded that fiscal, money, demand and 
supply shocks are accountable for economic fluctuations in roughly equal relative weights. 
 
A  PLAUSIBLE GENERAL THEORY  
 
            In  this  section  a  general  theory  is  advanced  for  one  (a  credit-oriented  market 
economy) family of economic systems by focusing on four factors: 1. factors which initiate  
 
the cycle--exogenous factors (shocks to the systems); 2. factors which are activated by the 
cycle--endogenous factors (system dynamics); 3. factors which accentuate (aggravate) the 
cycle--exogenous  factors  (business  and  governmental  policies);  and  4.  factors  which 
terminate  the  cycle--endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  (system  dynamics  and 
governmental policies). 
            The  general  theory  is  constructed  along  the  lines  suggested  by  Kaldor  [1960], 
Cobeljic' and Stojanovic' [1969], and Harrod [1973].  These authors maintain that: (1) the 
economic cycle is an inherent part of the growth process, and (2) three factors account for 
economic  growth:  (a)  savings,  (b)  population  growth,  and  (c)  technological  progress.  
Savings is important, but it is an endogenous variable.  The other factors are exogenous 
variables with a more significant role in producing economic fluctuations.  Many individual 
non-labelled factors jointly may produce an economic cycle.  For instance, Japan was a net 
importer prior to 1970, and the balance of payments exercised a predominant influence 
upon the growth and production cycles during the postwar period [Shinohara 1969, 77].  
However, business cycles caused by the cumulative effect of these combined non-labelled 
factors would be quite sporadic and relatively small.  While evidence supports coexistence 
of  small  and  large  shocks,  substantial  evidence  exists  which  negates  the  small-shock 
hypothesis [Blanchard and Watson 1986, 146].  
            For most economies, the business cycle would be comprised of: (1) an investment 
cycle and (2) a consumption cycle.  Yet, the growth path of the economy is directed and 
redirected by exogenous shocks (Sn) to the system (e.g., catastrophes and cartelization).  
According  to  Cobeljic'  and  Stojanovic'  [1969,  20  and  chap.11],  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
socialist countries are caused by technological progress.  While the investment cycle has an 
important  role  in  explaining  economic  fluctuations  in  socialists  economies,  the 
consumption  cycle,  due  to  the  rationing  process,  would  not  have  a  significant  role.  
However, shocks, such as population growth, do affect the investment cycle.     
            Hicks [1950], Kalecki [1954, 126], Kaldor [1960, 222], and Harrod [1973] have 
stressed that there exists a growth trend upon which cycles (fluctuations) are imposed.  The 
trend line reflects the average effect of all prior shocks to the system; this condition holds 
since the cycles are imposed on the growth trend of the economy.  This position is well  
 
accepted [Danthine and Girardin 1989, 6; Zarnowitz 1985, 532].   The growth trend is due 
to two growth factors: (a) population growth, and (2) technological progress.  However, 
business  cycles  are  caused  not  by  the  growth  factors  themselves,  but  by  shocks  to  the 
economic  system  and  the responses of the system to those shocks.  Thus, the problem 
facing economists is to find a procedure to adequately decompose economic data into the 
growth trend and cyclical components [9].  In Figure 1, each boom represents a movement 
from  one  equilibrium  seeking  level  to  another  higher  equilibrium  seeking  level.  





            In general, there are three factors which account for the magnitude of the amplitude.  
The  first  factor  is  the  desire  for  growth  at  a  level  which  is  not  sustainable  by  the 
technological and institutional setting. From a stock market point of view, this condition 
may  tempt  business  firms  to  accelerate  sales  of  a  later  period into an earlier period to 
achieve a desired level of growth.  The second factor is the set of business practices in force 
(short-term profit maximization - e.g., substitution of machines for labor).  According to 
Nadiri [1970, 1146], "when entrepreneurs anticipate a relative increase in real wages, they 
will, in the short run, substitute capital for labor (provided that the elasticity of substitution 
is positive) and then concentrate on innovations which are labor saving."  It would seem 
obvious  that  in  the  case  of  less  than  'full  employment'  in  the  economy,  such  a  labor- 
 
substitution  policy  can  only  lead  to  more  unemployment.  Another business practice is 
"double ordering" to ensure delivery of merchandise on time.  This practice can lead to 
unwarranted expansion of production.  The subsequent cancelling of the double order gives 
rise to an excess inventory accumulation and, hence, a contraction of production [Fortune 
1985].  The third factor is the structure of the financial system (e.g., the incorporation of 
banking services by business firms via credit granting ability; the lengthening of the credit 
repayment period; and corporate earnings retention policies). 
          The general theory advanced in this study is based on the behavior of business firms 
and the behavior of consumers. The evidence from these two sources should support the 
existence  of  three  cycles:  (1)  an  investment  cycle,  (2)  a  consumption  (durable  goods 
replacement) cycle, and (3) a credit cycle.  A similar position on the behavior of consumers 
is held by Hall [1986, 239,254-255], who concluded that there are shifts in consumption 
expenditures,  and  these  shifts  constitute  an  important  source  of  overall  economic 
fluctuation.  While not advocating a credit cycle, Friedman [1986, 437] maintains that while 
money is incapable of providing an explanation of economic fluctuations, the credit system 
can provide a better gauge of business activities and hence of economic fluctuation.  The 
investment cycle would be influenced by the decisions of the many firms whose quest for 
growth activate the "accelerator principle"; the consumption (durable goods replacement) 
cycle increases employment and activates the "multiplier principle".  Since consumption is 
a function of disposable income and consumers' credit position:  C = f(DPI, CCP), the 
credit  cycle  emerges  because  the  system  can  only  accommodate  so  much  growth  in  a 
certain period of time.  After a certain period of expansion, the consumers' credit position 
becomes strained - credit is saturated.  In earlier periods, a portion of future earnings will be 
spent  and  will  not  be  available  for  future  consumption  expenditures;  thus,  future 




            The following are sufficient conditions to produce fluctuations around the growth 
trend in an economy: (1) incomplete information; (2) uncoordinated production plans; (3) 
unrestrained credit; and (4) uncontrolled expansion.   
 
            Incomplete  Information.  Consumers'  actual  consumption  (Cp)  differ  from 
producers' expectation (e.g., Consumers plan X consumption; some producers expect X + 
α, while others expect X + ζ).  It is the lack of complete information (on producers' plans 
for investment and production, and the availability of money capital), which provides for 
the  volatility  of  expectations.    This  condition  is  governed  by  Harrod's  [1973,  33,41] 
"instability principle" which manifests itself in decentralized decision-making.  Goodwin 
[1989, 157-167] on both theoretical and mathematical grounds has established the validity 
of Harrod's "instability principle".  Volatility of expectations (a suggested cause of business 
cycles creation) is nurtured by uncertainty, lags, and miscalculations [Kaldor 1960, 231; 
Lowe 1965, 74-75; Shackle 1968, 120-121]. 
            Uncoordinated  Production  Plans.    Producers  decide  on  what  amounts  (Op)  to 
produce  independently  of  each  other,  accordingly  ΣOp  ≠  Cp.    When  ΣOp  >  Cp,  the 
following period would experience contraction.  When ΣOp < Cp, the following period 
would  be  characterized  by  over-expansion.    In  the  presence  of  coordinated  plans  and 
cooperation among the various segments of the economic system, it is possible for the 
adjustment (to the change dictated by the movement to the new equilibrium level) to be far 
less severe than in the absence of those conditions.  In this situation, the fluctuations around 
the trend line in Figure 1 would be fairly dampened.  
 
            Unrestrained Credit.  Customers are granted credit to the very limit of their credit 
capacities.  Their repayments are scheduled for several years into the future.  Except for 
basic consumption goods and services, this condition produces a significant negative impact 
upon  future  consumption.    It  is  only  when  the  debts  of  consumers  have  been  reduced 
considerably that another wave of frantic expansion can be experienced. 
 
            Uncontrolled  Expansion.    Regardless  of  its  cause,  when  demand  exceeds 
manufacturers' investment in inventory, price increases result. These increases trigger an 
upsurge in investment, which do not take into account the excess capacity in existence.  
Such demand ultimately fades and the end result is over-investment.  As the case may be, if 
there is an interest rate policy associated with rising prices, it would produce a contraction 
due to a disincentive for investment.  In the case of government fiscal policy, a tax credit is  
 
provided as an incentive to manufacturers to invest, but the government policymakers give 
no  consideration  to  either  the  ability  of  individual  firms  to  invest  or  existing  excess 
capacity.  This latter condition gives rise to a situation of chronic excess capacity. 
  
OUTLINE OF A BASIC MODEL OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 
            The assumptions underlying the basic model of cycle creation (for one family of 




 1.  Investment and production occur over time. 
 2.  Money is an endogenous variable in the economic system. 
 3.  The  economic  system  operates  at  close  to  full  employment  (as  defined  by  You 
[1979], frictional unemployment and excess capacity exists).   
 4.  Business firms are short term profit maximizers. 
 5.  Investment decisions are made in terms of nominal money.  
 6.  New plant and equipment incorporate new technology and are more productive than 
old plant and equipment. 
 7. The increase in money prices of new plant and equipment are considered as the cost 
of increased productivity. 
 8.  Diminishing returns are measured in terms of nominal dollars.  
 9.  Credit rationing and the calculations for consumers' decisions are made in nominal 
money terms.  
10. Want satisfaction, the basis of production, is not a constant physical quantum but a 
psychological quantum which is subject to change without notice.  
11. Sociological changes are shocks to the system. 
12. Population growth produces an increase in the demand for goods and services. 
13. Unbridled technological progress displaces labor, thus shrinking the demand for 
goods and services.   
 
 Resulting Conditions: System Dynamics  
 
1.   Wage rates rise as a result of assumptions 3 and 12. 
2.   Prices rise given assumption 12 and in response to condition 1. 
3.   Products  that  were  marginally  profitable  are  no  longer  profitable  because  of  an 
increase in production cost.  
4.   New  investments  in  plant  and  equipment  are  undertaken,  and  new  labor-saving 
technology is adopted.  
5.   The intensity in the demand for money and the demand for credit (given 2 and 4), 




Propagation Mechanisms: Business Practices 
 
1.   Retailers  maintain  sales  level  (given  system  dynamics  #5)  by  eliminating  down 
payments and extending the payment period.  
2.   Practice 1 aggravates the inflationary pressure; demand does not slacken and prices 
continue to rise. 
3.   Producers continue investing in plant and equipment and increase their output. 
4.   Central banks act to control inflation by raising the bank interest rates significantly. 
 
Terminating Factors: Diminishing Returns 
 
1.   The  significant  increase in  the  cost  of  financing production render some former 
profitable producers no longer profitable. In fact, some of them go out of business. 
2.   Now, unemployment creeps into the picture as layoffs occur due to factor 1.  
3.   Demand slackens due to factor 2.  




            The limited statistical data presented in the following tables merely serve to intimate 
at the plausibility of the theory as advanced.  Further research is needed to firmly establish 
the validity of the theory. 
 
The Investment Cycle  
 
            There  is  a  time  lag  (a  gestation  period)  for  investment.    This  time  lag  in  part 
explains the tendency of investment to overshoot the equilibrium level and introduces a 
certain automaticity of the business cycle into the economic system [Hamberg 1951, 363; 
Kalecki  1954,  128-131].    Furthermore,  the  lumpy  nature  of  investment  causes  an 
irregularity of investments, which accounts for economic fluctuations.  This condition holds 
for capitalist economies; however, it is also witnessed in the Japanese economy [Shinohara 
1969, 79].  Assuming that the firms making up the economic system are efficient and would 
take their existing plant capacities into account when making investment decisions, the 
common sentiment is that the marginal efficiency of capital ensures that the right amount of 
investment would take place.  However, in reality many firms despite high internal rates of 
return, owing to their size (small and medium) are not able to expand.  This condition has a 
stabilizing effect; it reduces the full potential of over-investment, but at the expense of 
efficient resource allocation.  
 
            The  following  equations  set  out  some  basic  relationships  predicated  on  the 
"marginal efficiency of capital": 
 
            (1.0)      I     =    f(D,i,Ku)   
                                                                           (I = Investment;   D = Demand:   i = Cost of credit;   Ku =  Plant Capacity Utilization) 
 
            (2.0)      i     =    g(S)     (S = Demand for Available Savings) 
 
            (3.0)      S    =     h(Al)   (Al = Asset levels - Plant size, receivables and inventory levels) 
 
            Data  presented  in  Table  3  suggest  that  the  "marginal  efficiency  of  capital"  is 
violated.  The low MCUs for 1975 (72%) and 1982 (70%) coincide with two cycle troughs.  
Although  there  was  a  cycle  trough  in  1980,  the peak  to  trough  was  relatively  short;  it 
covered a period of only 6 months.  Table 3 reveals that despite the increase in physical 
output  (MPI),  a  case  of  chronic excess capacity exists.  In spite of the existing excess 
capacity, investment in plant and equipment was undertaken each and every year. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TABLE  3 
 
Manufacturing Capacity Utilization (MCU),  
Manufacturing Production Index (MPI),  Business Capital Expenditures (BCE), and  
Capital Consumption Allowances (CCA) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                    MCU               MPI                              BCE                            CCA 
                                                      (1977=100)              (Current $ Billion)             ($Billion) 
            Year                 %                       %                  Total                 Mfg                 Total  
            1970                79                      77                    91.9                 37.0                 57.2    
            1975                72                      83                  142.4                 53.7                 90.2   
            1980                79                    100                  282.8               112.3               164.6   
            1981                78                    111                  315.2               126.5               196.3  
            1982                70                    102                  310.6               120.7               225.5  
            1983                74                    110                  304.8               116.2               259.7 
            1984                81                    123                  354.4               138.8               287.2 
            1985                80                    126                  387.1               153.5               328.3 
            1986                80                    129                  379.5               142.7               336.6 
            1987                81                    135                  388.6               145.5               349.2 
            1988                84                    142                  455.2               163.5               365.0 
            1989                84                    146                  507.4               183.8               351.7 
            1990                82                    147                  532.6               192.6               319.0 
            1991                78                    144                  530.0               184.3               307.1    
_________________________________________________________________________
Source for 1970-1987: 49,  pp.533,537,730.                Source for 1988-1991: 48,  pp.538,542,745.  
 
            It can be argued that the investments are being made by the efficient firms, while the 
excess capacity resides with the inefficient firms.  This argument requires an empirical 
answer.  Nevertheless, if the right business mergers occur, then the economic system will 
receive  a  shock.    Some  of  the  excess  capacity  will  be  absorbed,  and  there  will  be  a 
curtailment in investment.  Data on merger activities [US Department of Commerce 1992, 
534]  reveal  that  in  1980  there  were  1,558  mergers,  and  for  the  period  1983-1990,  the 
number of mergers respectively were: 2,395; 3,176; 3,489; 4,463; 4,024; 4,233; 4167; and 
4,168.  However, there were increases in plant capacity utilization only in 1988 and 1989.  
Evidently, the mergers did not produce the attainable efficiency in the economic system.  
            Since inventory is very costly to hold (given costs such as insurance, storage, etc.), 
questions are raised by the magnitudes of the ratios of inventory to sales in Table 4.  Is the 
inventory a shield against possible strikes or anticipation of future shortages?  Is the over-
investment in inventory held only by inefficient firms?   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE  4 
Sales and Inventories for Manufacturing and Trade, and Annual  
Average Prime Interest Rate 
(Current $ Billion) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                          Sales                 Inventory       Ratio of Average End               
 Annual           Monthly          End of Year      of  Month Inventory to             Average Prime 
Year                Average            Book Value     Average Monthly Sales            Interest Rate%   
1975                   182                    289                         1.52                                     7.86          
1978                   261                    400                         1.44                                     9.06           
1979                   298                    451                         1.44                                   12.67 
1980                   328                    494                         1.41                                   15.27 
1981                   357                    528                         1.52                                   18.87 
1982                   349                    582                         1.67                                   14.86          
1983                   369                    574                         1.56                                   10.79   
1984                   409                    620                         1.52                                   12.04          
1985                   419                    645                         1.54                                     9.93    
1986                   425                    657                         1.55                                     8.33 
1987                   453                    710                         1.57                                     8.20 
1988                   496                    740                         1.49                                     9.32 
1989                   526                    797                         1.52                                   10.87 
1990                   543                    819                         1.51                                   10.01 
1991                   535                    815                         1.52                                     8.46 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source for 1970-1987:  49,  pp.503,535.                    Source for 1988-1991:  48,  pp.507,540.  
 
            Here again, mergers can produce a shock to the system through the reduction of 
production to work out the excess investment in inventory.  However, owing to the fact that 
some mergers are induced by the monetary returns obtainable from the dismantling of the 
acquired firms, mergers do not have to result in the streamlining of the economic system.  
The evidence in Table 4 reveal that, except for 1980, 1984 and 1988 in which there were 
significant downward shifts in the ratio of inventory to sales, there is very little streamlining 
of the investment in inventory.  This condition may be due, in part, to the lowering of 
interest rates.   
 
The Consumption (Durable Goods Replacement) Cycle 
 
            Ratios of durable goods to consumption expenditures is presented in Table 5.  On a 
priori grounds owing to the long duration in the usage of durable goods, one would expect 
consumers to replace their durable goods in an irregular pattern.  Their replacement pattern 




TABLE  5 
 
Personal Consumption Expenditures (CE) and Consumer 
 Durable Goods Expenditures (DGE)  
(Current $ Billions) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                CE                                      DGE                                 Ratio %  
Year                       Amount          Index             Amount         Index                      DGE/CE  
 
1980                     1,732.6           100                 219.3               100                         12.6   
1981                     1,915.1           110                 239.9               109                         12.5 
1982                     2,050.7           118                  252.7              115                         12.3  
1983                     2,234.5           129                 289.1               132                         12.9 
1984                     2,430.5           140                 335.5               153                         13.8 
1985                     2,629.0           152                 372.2               170                         14.2 
1986                     2,807.5           162                 406.5               185                         14.5 
1987                     3,012.1           174                 421.9               192                         14.0 
1988                     3,296.1           190                 437.1               199                         13.3 
1989                     3,517.9           203                 459.8               209                         13.1 
1990                     3,742.6           216                 465.9               212                         12.4 
1991                     3,889.1           224                 445.2               203                         11.4 
_________________________________________________________________________
Source for 1970-1987:  49,  p. 421.             Source for 1988-1991:  48,  p. 428.  
 
            As revealed in Table 5, the ratio (DGE/CE) declined in 1982 and again in 1987, at 
which time it continued through 1991. These changes in the ratio suggest the existence of a 
durable goods replacement cycle. 
 
The Credit Cycle 
 
            In the U.S., during the period 1975-1982, repayment schedules on new car loans and 
mobile home loans were for a period of 36 months and for 84 months, respectively.  In 
1983, these repayment schedules were for 48 months and 120 months [US Department of 
Commerce 1989, 500].  Table 6 reveals the significant impact of this change in repayment 
schedules.  CICP as a percentage of DPI rose steadily from 15.2% in 1983 to 19.1% in 
1987.    There  are  two  credit  saturation  periods:  1982  and  1990-91.    These  two  credit 
saturations  have  produced  the  1980-1982  business  cycle  in  the  US  economy  and  the 
recession which began in July 1990 and has continued through 1993. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TABLE  6 
 
Consumption Expenditures(CE), Disposable Personal Income(DPI)  
and Consumer Installment Credit Position(CICP) 
(Current $ Billions)  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                      CE                                DPI                            CICP1            CICP/ 
Year                Amount           Index    Amount          Index   Amount           Index   DPI-%  
   
1980                1,732.6             100     1,918.0             100      297.6               100       15.5    
1981                1,915.1             110   *2,061.0             107      310.7               104       15.1 
1982                2,050.7             118     2,261.4             118      323.5               109       14.3 
1983                2,234.5             129     2,428.1             127      367.9               124       15.2    
1984                2,430.5             140     2,668.6             139      442.5               149       16.6 
1985                2,629.0             152     2,838.7             148      517.8               174       18.2 
1986                2,807.5             162     3,019.6             157      571.8               192       18.9 
1987                3,012.1             174     3,209.7             167      613.0               206       19.1 
1988                3,296.1             190     3,548.2             185      664.0               223       18.7 
1989                3,517.9             203     3,788.6             197      718.9               241       19.0 
1990                3,742.6             216     4,058.8             212      735.1               247       18.1 
1991                3,889.1             224     4,209.6             219      729.4               245       17.3 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Balance outstanding on instalment credit at end of year.    * Estimated to conform to this series. 
   GNPIPD 1980-1987 (1982=100): 85.7, 94.0, 100.0, 103.9, 107.7, 110.9, 113.9, 117.7 (respectively).  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source : 1970-1987 -  49, pp. 421,424, 499.    1988-1991 -  48,  pp. 428,434, 504.    1991 DPI - 47, p.445.  
 
            Table 7 provides some insight into the marginal propensity to consume which is 
influenced by the consumers' credit position.   Marginal consumption (δCE) is negatively 
related to marginal income (δDPI) and positively related to marginal credit (δCICP). 
 
            (4)         δCE     =          α  -  β1δDPI  +  β2δCICP 
 
This condition obtains because marginal income is already hypothecated for consumption 
enjoyed in earlier periods; therefore, marginal consumption must be financed by credit.  As 
revealed in Table 7, a credit cycle ended in 1982.  Subsequently (1983-1989), an upsurge in 
spending occurs concurrent with increases in instalment credit. However, in 1986, there 
was a slight dip in marginal consumption.  The spending spree ends in 1990, which is the 






Annual Changes in Expenditures, Income and Credit Position  
1980 through 1987 
(Current $ Billions) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
              Period                          CE                              DPI                              CICP     
 
            1981-80                       182                              143                                13  
            1982-81                       135                              200                                13 
            1983-82                       184                              167                                44 
            1984-83                       196                              240                                74 
            1985-84                       198                              170                                75 
            1986-85                       179                              181                                54 
            1987-86                       204                              190                                41 
            1988-87                       284                              338                                51 
            1989-88                       222                              240                                55 
            1990-89                       225                              270                                16 
            1991-90                       146                              151                               -  6 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Derived from Table 6. 
 
EVALUATION OF THE CLASSIFIED BUSINESS CYCLE CREATION FACTORS 
 
            In this section of the paper, the identified business cycle factors are categorized and 
briefly argued to be either disqualified or qualifying cycle creation factors.  The basis for  
 
their classification is an evaluation in terms of their effect upon the economic system.  All 
theories  discussed  in  this  study  have  contributed  in  one  fashion  or  another  to  a  better 
understanding of business cycles.  Thus, the classification of a factor as disqualified is not 




            Monetary dislocation is disqualified as a cycle creation factor because it is a highly 
irregular occurrence; as such it would be an irregular fluctuation which would have to be 
adjusted for to determine the magnitude of the business cycle.  Money shocks (changes in 
the volume of money) and unsystematic money shocks are disqualified because money is an 
endogenous  variable  in  the  economic  system,  and  there  is  empirical  evidence  which 
supports this position.  Financial accounting information is not a cycle creation factor for it 
is an observational report which simply provides for a description of the state of affairs.  
How this state of affairs was brought about is of concern to interested parties.  Furthermore, 
decisions  to  invest  are  based  upon  ex  ante  projections  of  profits,  and  not  on  ex  post 
measures of past profits.  Corporate earnings retention would aggravate the cycle situation 
owing to the misalignment of financial capital and investment opportunities, but it is not a 




            Deficient demand  is a shock to the system.  Credit expansion,  whether it is solely 
within the jurisdiction of the central bank or subject to the policies of business firms, it is a 
shock.    Irregularity  of  investment  is  a  cycle  factor  which  is  inherent  in  the  economic 
system.  Volatility of expectations is a cycle factor due to the lack of complete information.  
Uncoordinated  production  plans  would  constitute  a  cycle  factor  because  of  adjustment 
shocks  due  to  overestimation  and  underestimation  of  other  producers'  output  plans.  
Volatility of expectations combined with uncoordinated production plans would engender 
uncontrolled expansion.  Technological shocks resulting from the substitution of labor with 
labor  displacing  technology  is  a  major  factor  affecting  disposable  income  and,  hence, 
contributes to deficient demand.  While technology contributes to progress, if it remains 




            The various theories of business cycles creation presented in this historical setting 
offer contributions to the total development of a general theory.  The theoretical analysis 
does suggest that any of the various factors alluded to individually would be sufficient 
under certain rare circumstances to induce a business cycle.  Invariably, no individual factor 
would  be  sufficiently  strong  to  produce  a  cycle  without  the  aid  of  a  few  of  the  other 
identified factors.  Accordingly, single factor theories can quite safely be considered as 
special cases of the general theory as expounded in this paper.   
            This paper has advanced a general theory for one family of economic systems--a 
credit-oriented  market  economy.    Although  the  empirical  observations  in  the  study  are 
limited, the statistical data presented in this analysis do suggest that the theory as developed 
is plausible.  However, longer time series data for the US and other similar economies 
would have to be subjected within this study's framework to sophisticated statistical testing 
so that this plausible theory may be validated or refuted. 
            Future research should focus on: (1) identifying countries which constitute other 
families of economic systems; (2) discerning the factors which are influential in promoting 
business  cycles  in  those  respective  families  of  economic  systems;  and  (3)  developing 
general  theories  related  to  those  specific  families  of  economic  systems.    Once 
generalizations  have  been  made  about  those  families,  common  and  uncommon 
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